

# CONSIDERATIONS

SUBMITTED TO THE

PEOPLE OF IRELAND,

ON

Their Present Condition with Regard to  
TRADE and CONSTITUTION.

IN ANSWER TO

A PAMPHLET, lately published,

ENTITLED,

*“Observations on the Mutiny Bill, &c.”*

Aggredere, O Magnos, aderit, jam Tempus, Honores.

VIRG.

Nullum numen abest, si sit Prudentia.

JUV.

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L E T T E R

TO THE

PEOPLE OF IRELAND.

HOWEVER disinclined I feel myself to add any thing to the oppression under which the public already groans from the weight of polemical politics, I cannot, as an Irishman, and a member of the British empire, suffer to pass unnoticed a pamphlet which hath lately made its appearance amongst us, under the title of "*Observations on the Mutiny-Bill, &c.*"

The materials of which this pamphlet is composed do not, in my judgment, ren-

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der it so formidable, as adventitious circumstances do — the very high opinion justly and universally entertained of the talents and integrity of the Gentleman to whom this work is ascribed, and the critical period of its publication, so very awful to the British empire, are considerations which would make it dangerous to despise a work of much less merit ; because the influence of these will give to plausibility the effect of sound reasoning, and may, eventually, convert the fictitious woe, pictured by an heated imagination, into scenes of real tragedy.

The effusion of human blood which has desolated a considerable part of the British empire, may, in a great measure, be ascribed to the effusion of political ink ; and when in this country, and at this time, a pamphlet is put forth, inspiring the people with sentiments of distrust and of discontent ; endeavouring to prove to them that their trade and constitution, which had been lately enlarged and secured in a degree exceeding

exceeding the example of all former times, are again “*thrown back into suspense*” by the treachery and venality of the parliament; and laying before the people, as matter of notoriety and unquestionable fact, the author’s own suggestions of corrupt and criminal intercourse between the Castle and persons of the first rank and confidence in the country; exhibiting at the same time, under the affectation of general description, portraits, individually characterised—such a publication, I say, however it might be neglected in times of national security, is now a serious matter.

The author of the pamphlet must agree with me, that a condition of public affairs may arise, in which all considerations of domestic political concern will be suspended; and in which an opposition to the efforts of government, essential perhaps in general to the preservation of our constitution, will be considered, by virtuous men, as a state crime. The public will judge between him and me, whether or no that period be now arrived.

Let

Let no Irishman then suffer the glow of indignation, produced by the recollection of former contentions, so far to inflame his expectations at present, as to create in him a vain hope of exemption from the calamities which will attend England in her fall.

The kingdom of Ireland is no less appendant to the crown of England by law and constitution, than her fate is by situation to the fortunes of Great-Britain. She can rise or fall but with them. This appendancy of Ireland to the crown of a *greater* country, in which country too the executive authority of both kingdoms, with its pomp and patronage, resides, does necessarily create, without any malicious intent, a comparative inferiority; and this comparative inferiority has unavoidably appeared upon some occasions in symptoms of partiality, no less, perhaps, in point of constitution than of trade—but does any man look for an Irish revolution?—does  
any



any Irishman wish that Ireland were out of the protection of England?

If neither of these be desirable or expedient; and if it is obvious that the danger is truly alarming, to which the empire is now exposed by a combination of the malignancy of its antient enemies, the ingratitude of its old allies, and the more lamentable ravages of a self-wasting civil war.—If I say the condition of public affairs is such that they seem to demand the interposition of something above human power to avert the ruin of the state; it must be admitted that this is not the season for domestic complaint, but that to risque the publication of any thing which may tend to disaffect a part of what remains of the empire, altho' it should be clothed in the robes of patriotism, *adjusted by the hands of the graces themselves*, will subject the author to the imputation of a confederacy with the common enemy against the state; or, indeed, with the more determined

mined enemies of the country, the *British faction*.

I hope I shall find an excuse in the feelings of my countrymen, if it should be thought that, upon this subject, I express myself too strongly. The honour and credit of the Irish nation, in point of loyalty and gratitude, are at stake; and when I recollect the kind, the comprehensive, the successful manner, in which our concerns were managed, in the last sessions of the British parliament, by one of the ablest, and certainly one of the most liberal and virtuous ministers Great Britain has ever been blest with; and when I perceive that the dearest interests of this nation are again to be put to risque in order to serve the purposes of interested individuals, I cannot repress the effusions of my indignation.

A community capable of deliberate ingratitude is not likely to rise into an illustrious nation. It is therefore become necessary



cessary that the people should have all the information upon this subject, of which it is capable ; that the fount of discontent may not acquire additional force by reverberation, but that being confined within due limits, it may waste its expiring murmurs, where it had its birth, in the cell of faction.

Our most gracious sovereign, his ministers, and the British nation must not be deceived, nor must the loyal kingdom of Ireland be traduced. Impressions concerning our people, and particularly our glorious volunteers, must not be permitted to be taken from the paintings of a man who views our political concerns through the medium of intemperate zeal, and who, impracticable himself, would give to our politics the same inflexibility which characterizes his own mind. Eager to accomplish the freedom of Ireland, he seeks it in extremes, and, in the severity of an unaccommodating spirit, he loses the very end he would die to obtain. His arguments

ments and his sentiments are retailed by others, who have an interest in agitating the people, and who, without virtue or talents themselves, endeavour to find the road to public favour by a light reflected from his credit.

There is not perhaps in human experience a proof more demonstrative of the imperfection of our nature, than that exhibited by the facility, which every pretender to public spirit finds in the acquisition of popularity. No experience, no multiplication of example by examples, altho' the sum touch upon the very limits of numerical extent, will put the people on their guard against imposture. Every minister is a knave, and every patriot is a faint! the very benefits offered to the people by the first are frequently rejected as insidious and deceitful, whilst the most nauseous compositions prepared by the latter are swallowed down, without examination, even to the dregs.

If

If time and experience, the great rectifiers of human error, had their efficacy when applied in a comparison between ministers and patriots, I would undertake to shew, from the history of our own country, since the Revolution, the example of ten honest ministers, for that of one faithful patriot.

Ministers indeed are unfairly dealt with, as will appear by considering the nature of their institution. The necessity, which gave rise to the origin of government, implies a reciprocalness of confidence between the governors and the governed, which the people are always too willing to forget. When man had forsaken a savage state, and first resolved to live in society, it became necessary, that a portion of his native liberty should be surrendered by each individual, for the advantage of the whole. They found that society could not exist otherwise; for each man in a state of unlimited freedom would be regulated in all things by his own will, and the

law of force alone would decide what was right and what was wrong. To remedy this they instituted certain rules to determine the conduct of every man towards another; which took from each a certain portion of his own will, or freedom. The deposit of this code, together with the charge of the public affairs of the community, first constituted, in the hands of chosen persons, what is called government; a dangerous, and invidious post in society! subjecting the possessor to the suspicions and machinations of all around him. It is the nature of man to hanker after his own free will; and to regard as inimical and odious the authority which deprives him of the unlimited use of it. This natural tendency to freedom has produced various combinations of powers in the structure of the frame of different governments; but of all which ever did, or, perhaps, ever will exist, that of our own country is the most admirable—compared to all others it seems of divine origin, whilst they bear the impressions of human infirmity.

mity. It extends protection, and distributes justice with unerring equality to all the subjects of the state.—They alone, who administer our government, seem doomed to persecution; and, of all persons in the realm, enjoy least the protection of the constitution. The minister of England is perhaps the man in the kingdom least benefited by its freedom, and is certainly the only man you may traduce with impunity. Like the eunuch of a seraglio he is fated to superintend a treasure which he is disqualified to possess, and in an extensive scene of fruition he is the only person incapable of enjoyment. Our grand seignior, the people, too, treats him as the slave of despotism; for every delinquency in him is a state crime, and the minister's head is his lightest forfeit. Each man in the realm is born his accuser, for every man has an inheritance in the democracy of our government, and his vigilancy is exactly proportioned to the opinion he entertains of his interest in it. Tribunals are arbitrarily erected to try the minister

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in every corner of the empire, and, what is most unpardonably unjust, he is condemned under laws, which do not judicially apply to his case; for we insist upon squaring the minister's conduct in all things by the most rigid rules of strict liberty, from which his very institution, in the original frame of government, was a departure. We put him into a situation where he must be altogether governed by expediency; and we make him responsible, as if he had the entire use of free will.

In our constitution, a stranger to the nature of it would be inclined to think that government had been instituted with the same view that sportsmen propagate foxes, for the pleasure of hunting them down; and indeed it very often happens, that the country gentlemen, when they unkennel a minister, are as unconcerned about the mischief they are likely to do the country, as the sportsmen in the fox-chase are. The property of honest, industrious



trious people is found, in the end, to have suffered all the damage !

When I venture to offer to the people some considerations to induce them to a reasonable degree of confidence in the persons ordained to govern the state, it is not my intention to put them off their guard, touching that vigilancy, which the spirit of the constitution demands peculiarly at their hands. I do not wish to lull the people into a political lethargy, but I would warn them against those who want to “*sting*” them into madness.—I would have them consult their own experience, and they will discover “*a simple but great truth,*” that their undistinguishing patronage of all pretenders to public virtue is become the great evil of the constitution;—that corruption and public expence, pouring in by this passage, are likely to overwhelm and confound all things; and that in themselves alone lies the remedy.

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The political, like the natural constitution, is liable to the invasion of infirmity, but it is observed of both, that the final dissolution, which inevitably awaits them, is the effect of a cause existing in the first principles of formation. Every government in the universe contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction.—*The facility of the people is the fatal malady of free governments.* The liberties of the cities of antient Greece, and those of Rome expired under it; and so will our own: but as it is the duty of every man to prolong his natural life, tho' death is inevitable, so it is the part of a good citizen to devise the means of protracting the fate of our incomparable constitution. If a portion of that vigilancy, with which the people, very often unnecessarily, torment and obstruct government, were employed in scrutinizing the pretensions of their various demagogues, the constitution would last the longer.

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It is a lamentable reflection, and one which infinitely mortifies the pride of man, that a form of government, so admirably excellent in its structure, should yet be found to be incapable of duration, and to derive its decay from that very principle, which seems the boast of its perfection.

If we investigate the passions, by which the human mind is actuated, at two different periods of life, I am persuaded a close observer will discover the effect of an impulse, which is nearly constant in nature, and which is gradually operating a derangement of the balance of our constitution—I mean the notable difference between the political sentiments of our early life, and those of our more mature age. The fine ardour of youth, prone to license and impatient of restraint, views the exercise of power and authority with a jealous eye; and, as the same early glow directs the mind to pursuits, wherein fame and personal distinction are to be acquired, it  
generally

generally happens that an outrageous opposition to the measures of government marks the first steps into life of our young men, and that parliament becomes the scene of their ambitious warfare. Being once entered into the vortex of party, a man is hurried rapidly and irresistibly along with it, whilst the applause of a “*listening senate,*” and the huzzas of the people increasing the intoxication, leave him little leisure and less inclination for political reflection. When time, however, and a certain satiety bring him back to a review of his parliamentary conduct; when he reflects coolly on the immediate effects of it, and the consequences likely to follow, he begins to perceive that in his political journey he has been travelling astray; that he has been contributing to encrease the expences of his country, and the burdens of his fellow-citizens, without benefiting the constitution; and that, with the most pure and virtuous intentions, he has been little better than a pander in the profligacy and prostitution of others. Disgusted by the  
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reflection, but unable to tread back his devious steps; disqualified by a privation of vigour to stem the torrent of more youthful eloquence, and thus compensate in old age for the follies of youth, he is reduced to be content to sit down by the side of administration, a silent voter for the remainder of his life, and to become an indignant witness of the mischiefs done the country by the rising generation. The motives of his change, misrepresented by interested demagogues, and misunderstood by the unreflecting people, are attributed to corruption and avarice, the characteristic features of old age. And thus, his youth having been spent in giving opposition to government, his old age becomes a reproach to it. The whole of his vigour having been exhausted in efforts to impede the progress of the wheels of the machine, he hangs a dead weight upon it at last; and in each period of his life contributes more or less to the injury of the constitution.



I perceive that I have been delayed in my progress towards the argument of the pamphlet, by sentiments and reflections which lay in the way, but which appear to me to have arisen, not unnaturally, out of the consideration of the subject. The trenches being now opened, let us take a view of the fortification. This redoubtable pamphlet, containing a call the most peculiarly bold upon the spirit and feelings of the people of Ireland we have ever been acquainted with, is reared upon two great pillars of argument—the one concerning our trade, the other our constitution. These are subjects with regard to which the people of Ireland are yet sore. The sudden and unexpected concession to us of unlimited trade on the part of Great-Britain, after a violent and unjustifiable detention of it for above a century; that trade! by means of which she became the mistress and the wonder of the world; that trade! for the exclusive enjoyment of which her legislature has endeavoured at every risk to vindicate a supremacy over the  
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subordinate parts of the empire ; that trade ! on account of the usurpation of which she has lived in jealousy and enmity with us for a century past ; that she should so suddenly, so generously, and so equally admit us into a participation of that trade with her, is a matter we so little expected, that we scarcely believe her sincere in it ; and the astonished Irishman receives the boon, as Scrub does Archer's generosity in the play — “ *Ay ! it is a guinea, by this light ! but I suppose, brother Martin, you expect one and twenty shillings in change.*”

The motives of policy which determined the minister of England to open the trade of Ireland at this time particularly, are well understood, but foreign to my present purpose. I must however observe, that, under this national tendency to suspicion, the arguments urged upon the public in this pamphlet, with a degree of the most enthusiastic fire, and backed by the credit of one of the most respectable members of the state, become formidable to an antagonist, and will  
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be encountered under fearful odds — I feel that I have men's prejudices and passions to contend with, but I appeal to their reason only.

“ *No people, says the author of the pamphlet, “ will be satisfied who conceive themselves cheated of a free grant of trade, and see a constitution rescued out of the hands of one parliament to be mangled by another.”* Here is the ground of the complaint of the pamphlet—the grant of free trade the author supposes to be entirely defeated, by means of an inadequate duty laid by our parliament on refined sugars imported here from Great-Britain; and all the advantages derived to the constitution of Ireland in the previous part of the last sessions of our parliament, he argues to have been lost in the end of it, by the nature of the Mutiny Bill. In short we are to believe that, under a co-operation of deceit and corruption, the Irish nation hath been cajoled of trade, which had been promised her in extent; and frustrated of constitution, which she  
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had conceived hopes of accomplishing; that she had been tricked by government, and betrayed by parliament. The question of trade, although most materially necessary to be proved, the author thinks fit to leave untouched. He assumes it as clear to all the world; and relying on the feelings of the people for the success of this irrational assumption, he makes it one of the two great columns which support his fabric. It were perhaps a sufficient answer to his pamphlet, to enter into the question of the equalization duty on sugars, and to shew that there never was a more impudent! a more selfish! nor a more unjustly founded outcry, than that raised by the Sugar-Bakers of Ireland, the Committee of Merchants of Dublin, and their Abettors, on the subject of the Sugar-duty! That the duty, as now settled by the Irish parliament, is considerably in favour of the Irish manufacturer, on the exact footing of equalization — which was the condition of the grant of the West-India trade to Ireland; and that, if the demand of the Sugar-Bakers and the

Committee

Committee of Merchants had been complied with by our parliament, it would have been extremely injurious to this kingdom, as well as a breach of parliamentary faith and honour. The proofs, I say, fully exhibited with regard to this question, would be a proper answer to the whole of a pamphlet which comes forth to inflame the people on the subject of public grievances; because, when it were shewn that the first and most important of these grievances, exists but in the ignorance of the author, and the deceit of the persons interested in the trade, it would naturally condemn his complaint as frivolous and groundless. This task, however, I will reserve for another occasion, no less on account of its bulk, than that I may not appear to avoid the author at present; and this duty, I pledge myself to my fellow-citizens, I will not delay, being induced to it by two considerations; first, lest the assertions of the Sugar-Bakers, &c. receiving confirmation from so great an authority as the writer of the pamphlet,

should

should thereby gain credit with the public, to the abuse of truth and justice ; and, secondly, on account of the insufficiency of two pamphlets, which have been already published on the subject of the sugar duty here, the authors of which appear to me not to have had all the information upon it necessary to give thorough conviction.

Now as to the Mutiny Bill, by which, according to our author, Ireland has lost her constitution, let us see how far his reasoning is conclusive. In every government, however simple, or however modified, the purse and the sword are the two great operative springs of the machine. All motion and efficacy proceeding from them, it necessarily follows that in the exact proportion of the power of these will the state be formidable abroad ; and in the proportion of limitation, exactly, by which the executive authority is restrained in the use or abuse of them at home, will the constitution be free, or the contrary. In vain will the people affect to hold their independency



dependency by the strings of the purse, if the power of the sword shall be unlimited in the hands of the chief magistrate; for an army will as readily levy contributions in their native as in an enemy's country. Therefore it is that, since a standing army has become an indispensable part of the political arrangement of Great Britain, the representatives in parliament of the people of England have contrived, as much as possibly they could, consistent with the necessity of confiding the command and patronage of the army uncontrollably to the executive authority, to make the army a parliamentary army; by rendering it dependent on parliament from year to year, as well for its pay, as for the code of laws by which alone it can be regulated. The constitution reasons thus:—If, within a year, the day shall come, when the crown will neither have money to pay nor law to regulate the army, unless parliament shall think fit to renew the grant of both, the army will disband itself. By this distribution of power the executive authority  
has



has the effectual use of the sword for the defence of the country against foreign enemies; and the parliament is enabled to render the sword, in the hand of the prince, innoxious with regard to the liberties of the people. So much of the constitution of England I have thought it expedient to state, as the whole of the author's reasonings applies to it. I will now endeavour to collect his argument, as it lies diffused in that luxuriancy of aphorismatic declamation, which at once makes the ornament and protection of the author's opinions; impetuously hurrying the reader down the rapid current of his eloquence, whilst it spreads difficulty and delay in the way of his pursuers. I am sure he will lose no part of his strength by concentration.

The caution and prudence, argues the author, in which the democracy of England has encircled the purse and the sword are altogether neglected in the provision made for the security of public liberty in Ireland. The crown, already in possession of a per-

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petual hereditary revenue, independent of parliament; with a law for collecting thereof, eventually perpetual, by means of the clause which enacts, that it shall continue in force to the end of the then next sessions of parliament, was most improvidently accommodated in the last sessions of our parliament, with a mutiny law for the regulation of the forces in Ireland, likewise perpetual. This combination, argues the author, leaves the constitution of Ireland at the mercy of the crown; for the King, having no urgency in his own necessities for calling a parliament in Ireland, will naturally wish to get rid of those troublesome partners of his power;—and the parliament being discontinued, his hereditary revenue, already £600,000. per annum, will enormously encrease from the increase of imports, which will take place under the abolition of the additional duties. His civil exigencies will vanish with his parliament; for parliamentary corruption, and the civil establishment, the two great sources  
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of expence, according to our author, will march off, hand in hand, and the whole revenue of the kingdom will then be in the grasp of the prince, and applicable to his military purposes solely.

The army in Ireland being thus established upon a perpetual revenue, adequate to its support, and a perpetual law constitutionally provided for the regulation of it, the crown is invited to dissolve the constitution of Ireland. Let us hear the author's own words:—“ *To arm the chief magistrate, or rather indeed to arm the claims of the British parliament with a perpetual law for the regulation and accommodation of any indefinite number of troops his Majesty is pleased to keep up in Ireland, appears to me a measure of an unwarrantable and unseasonable, corrupt and a crazy confidence.*”

“ *I must observe that the army thus rendered by your law unconfined in its numbers, and by the same law made independent of parliament for its regulation, however brave*  
and

and respectable, is not a native army, but of that very country which claims to make law for Ireland; also I must observe that the minister who in fact governs that army, is the British minister, not responsible to your parliament, nor resident in your country: so that now by this pernicious bill, this minister, a foreign and contemptuous character, in a safe and distant capacity, free from the controul of an expirable authority, may send into this country any number of troops which the return of his pride may require, the collected strength of the empire at the close of the war shall be able to furnish; and he may billet them upon you in execution of any project of power, or avarice, or revenge, to collect a British tax, or disperse an Irish association, or trample on an Irish spirit; and the people of this country have the mortification to think that they may by their own law, a law grafted on their best exertions, be obliged to billet and accommodate troops quartered upon them for their destruction: or though his Majesty's ministers may not choose to come to extremity, yet may they gradually and at their leisure, armed  
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*with our law and encouraged by our humiliation, raise new regiments, a measure both of corruption and force ; or throw into this kingdom such a body of troops as may break her spirit, watch her motions, controul her free action, and finally make those who before thought it inexpedient to deny, soon think it inexpedient to resist, the usurped authority of the British parliament.---I say, the minister may do this at his leisure, and build by degrees a system of tyranny on the foundation of our own law."*

After the author has thus shewn the dangers to which, by this law, the liberties of Ireland are exposed, he very kindly turns his thoughts towards protecting the freedom of the legislature of Great Britain against the effects of it; a conduct very generous in an Irish patriot, considering that, under his own stating, Ireland can incur the mischiefs arising from the law only through the ambition of the English legislature, or the self-interestedness of the British people.

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“ *A military government, (says he) being thus established in Ireland, if the British parliament shall hereafter attempt to control a military prince by the power which she conceives is reserved by her Annual Mutiny Bill, her intention may be frustrated by our law, the British troops illegal in England may be removed to Ireland and kept up here against her, the limitation of her law is repealed in the perpetual duration of ours, its purpose lost, and this island formed into an immense barrack to accommodate the military ambition of some king in his defiance of the British nation in the unconstitutional continuation, and violent application of his army.*”

This Irish Mutiny Law is an extraordinary agent. First, it is an instrument for enforcing the claims of the British parliament over the independency of Ireland; and, *presto*, in the same moment it is the instrument of the destruction of that very parliament.

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The author's next lamentation turns upon the hardships and violence of this act with regard to the military people themselves ; and in the very same page he records the numerous outrages committed lately by the soldiers in Ireland, in order, I presume, to prove that daily outrage does not require perpetual restraint.

He next argues that the parliament of Ireland, being octennial in its own duration, exceeded the limits of its power when it enacted this law perpetually ; as it did likewise when it adopted that clause of the English Mutiny-bill, giving to the crown a power of adding articles of war not extending to life or limb.

This is the whole of the author's complaint, upon which an invocation to the people, particularly the volunteers, of Ireland is founded—exciting them, not very indirectly, to exertions of efficacy and of vengeance. It is not my purpose to examine too nicely the intention of this call,

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I will not scrutinize with the severity of a crown-lawyer the tendency of his hint to the volunteers, that the question of the legality of an army of self-constituted and self-disciplined militia in the land, disclaiming the control of the executive authority of the state, “ *is lost in their numbers.*” I know that it is not necessary, for I have the fullest conviction that the noble and ardent spirit, so remarkably high at this time in the kingdom, is the comfortable source of security no less of the peace and property of the inhabitants of the kingdom, than of the rights of his majesty’s crown of Ireland. But before I go further, I must take notice of two assertions contained in the argument, and which have arisen, I apprehend, from misinformation and mistake—the one, that whilst Great-Britain affected to give up the question of legislative supremacy over Ireland by permitting us to originate a Mutiny-law for ourselves, she had named Ireland in the provisions of her own Mutiny-law. The other,

other, that the crown has a power of encreasing the troops in Ireland *indefinitely*.

As to the first, the ink is scarcely dry when the fact has belied the assertion. The Mutiny-bill of England has passed the legislature without any such clause. Our good patriotic friends indeed, in the opposition there, were willing to have the bill recommitted for the purpose of including Ireland; and, I presume, the information to this country that it would be included, must have originated from those who were determined that it should—Mr. Fox boasts that he has connections in Ireland. As to the second assertion, that the king may encrease the forces of Ireland *indefinitely*, I beg leave to ask by what authority? I am sure the Irish Mutiny-bill communicates no such power. If he is possessed of it, he certainly had it before the mutiny law existed in Ireland, and it is therefore out of the question; but I did always, and do still believe, that the crown cannot add a single soldier to the establishment of ei-

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ther country, without the consent of parliament.

But let us examine the great and important part of the author's argument—I mean that which relates to the liberties of Ireland. The prince, provided with an independent revenue, a numerous army, and a perpetual law to regulate that army, may discontinue the Irish parliament, and rule by his own will. This subject deserves very serious consideration. And first I beg leave to ask the author some plain questions—Will Great-Britain look quietly on, and see the king of England employ the army of the empire to such purpose? Will the parliament of England entertain no fellow-feeling for the parliament of Ireland? Will the parliament of England be free from apprehensions for its own fate, when the king of both kingdoms, armed with the favours, lavished upon him by his Irish parliament, shall so openly and so ungratefully employ those very favours to the extermination of that parliament? Do not princes

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as well as subjects read history, or are their minds alone impervious to the lessons of instructions contained therein? The discontinuance of parliaments, and royal martyring are connected passages in the page of our records, and the knowledge of this circumstance, aided by the practice of modern patriotism, hath taught our princes how much more safe and effectual it is to *retain* than to disband a parliament.

The liberties of these countries may be yielded up by the people, but they will never be ravished from them. A choice of evils at some future day, I trust it is remote, may possibly determine the people to surrender at discretion, and in despair to prefer the dominion of one master to that of five hundred.

But is the author's argument of our danger founded under his own premises? I apprehend not.

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The king of Ireland will collect the army of the empire in Ireland, he will keep them there under the perpetuity of the Irish Mutiny-law, he will discontinue his Irish parliament, and maintain this army and himself by means of his hereditary revenue. It is fair to enquire what effect this will produce. When he shall disband the parliament, his hereditary revenue will be then his only resource. Thence he must draw the means to pay this indefinite number of troops, out of this fund he must maintain the civil establishment, as well as discharge the annual interest of the national debt.

The amount of the pay of his troops we cannot ascertain, for their number is indefinite; the expences of the civil establishment are about £169,000 per annum; the amount of the interest of the funded debt £105,000; and the expence of collecting the revenue is £158,000, making in all £432,000 per annum, which being deducted from £600,000, the present amount

amount of the hereditary revenue, will leave the mighty sum of £168,000 per annum to pay this numerous army and maintain the prince in Ireland. Here will be no budget to open, no new loans to supply deficiencies, for there is neither parliamentary provision of loan duties to discharge the interest, nor national security in the faith of parliament to induce a lending; œconomy has kicked these out of doors. Will a pitiful revenue then of £168,000 be sufficient to effect a subjection of this kingdom? It is trifling with men's understanding to offer them such ridiculous ground of apprehension! But our author will say, that it is no part of his plan to maintain the civil establishment, nor to provide the interest of the nation's debt—Then behold how he multiplies the difficulties of the prince!

The king of Ireland, relying on the support of his hereditary revenue, discontinues his parliament, suffers the civil establishment  
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of the kingdom to fall to the ground, and leaves the public creditors to starve for want of the interest of their money. A state of lawless anarchy and confusion in the country is the smallest evil resulting to the prince from this system; the want of the ordinary distribution of justice will be supplied by martial law; but will he have nothing to fear from the multiplication of enemies upon his hands? The members of the two houses of parliament and their adherents, all the persons supported by the civil establishment and their dependants, with the public creditors and their connections, will form an host comprehending nearly the strength of the whole kingdom. The king would have occasion for an indefinite number of troops indeed to keep such a body of enemies quiet, and to support such a government. And with what does he encounter all this! the amount of his hereditary revenue. Let us see what this hereditary revenue is. The gross produce of it at present is about £600,000 per annum, of this nearly £400,000 arises from  
 customs

customs and excise on the import of articles of luxury merely.—The hearth-money produces about £61,000, and the quit-rents about £65,000.—The residue comes in by the in-land excise. So that, except £126,000. the amount of the hearth-money and quit-rents, the whole of the hereditary revenue depends on commerce, and arises chiefly upon articles of luxury.

In the state of confusion produced by the author's plan, will commerce of any kind exist in the country, will importations at all take place, or will the subjects of Ireland import articles of luxury merely to produce a revenue to the Crown, to be employed in the purposes of their own subjection? Did not a late non-importation agreement in this kingdom, partially taken up and not very rigorously insisted upon, exclude nearly all the articles which were the object of the people's resentment at the time; and finally bring the very manufacturers of Great-Britain to a sense of our rights? And will not such an agree-  
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ment be more certain and operative, when the occasion for entering into it shall be more important and pressing? Will the people neglect to confederate when in the facility of a non-importation agreement alone they shall find perfect security against slavery, and at the same time annihilate the only resource of their tyrant?

In this point of view I have always considered the hereditary revenue of Ireland as a very innocent deposit in the hands of the Crown. The grant of it indeed is formally out of the restraint of parliament, but the payment of it is virtually within the will of the people.

It is perhaps not very essential to remark that the circumstances of perpetuity in laws made for the regulation of the forces in Ireland is not novel. All that have been enacted here for that purpose are perpetual. The 6th of Ann providing certain accommodation for soldiers on their march, is a perpetual law.—So is the 4th  
of



of George I. providing barracks and vesting the property of such barracks in the Crown for ever.

There is no possible way of turning the argument of this pamphlet, that it does not present a miserable frame of flimsy structure. It is the fanaticism of public virtue, holding up to its votaries the distorted visions and spectres of its own superstition, terrific indeed to the view, but which, brought to the test of palpability, elude the touch, and melt in idle air.

The author's apprehensions concerning the constitution of England, endangered, as he states, by this law, are equally vain and groundless.

Ireland, argues he, dangerously situated in the vicinage of England, may be made, under this law, a place of arms by an ambitious military prince for the destruction of the liberties of Great-Britain; that is, all the troops of the empire, being collected

in Ireland, may be insidiously prepared there to pounce unawares upon the parliament and people of Great-Britain, to the extinction of laws, liberty, and constitution! And pray was not the scheme as practicable before the Irish Mutiny Law had existence? The Crown, by its sole prerogative may transport the forces to any part of the empire at will. The army if it had been collected in Ireland would have been kept together there by the English Mutiny Law, which had been heretofore supposed to have force in Ireland, and all the purposes had been as effectually executed before as now. No, argues the pamphlet, for the army would have been disbanded by the expiration of the Mutiny Law, before the project could be ripe; whereas the perpetuity of the Irish act, rendering the authority of the prince over the army inextinguishable, eludes the caution of the British constitution and destroys it. In the first place, I humbly apprehend the project of such a revolution may as easily be executed in the space of two years, as  
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in that of two thousand; but let us try if the prudence of the British Mutiny Law does not exist in the Irish Mutiny Bill, for which purpose let us examine what the Irish Mutiny Bill is.

The Irish Mutiny Bill is a law, which enacts, That, hereafter, the forces in Ireland shall be governed by his Majesty's articles of war.—What is that which we call the articles of war? A portion of an English act of parliament enacted from year to year in the parliament of Great-Britain for the regulation of the army. Let the British parliament then but withhold the articles of war, and the perpetual Irish Mutiny Bill becomes absolutely dead letter; for it has no application. Thus we see that nothing can be more effectual than the resource is, which Great-Britain possesses against the dangers of the perpetuity of the Irish Mutiny Law.

I am aware that it will be objected to me, that this power, retained in Great-Britain,

Britain, of withholding at will the articles of war, by which the Irish army is to be regulated, is an usurpation upon the Irish legislature, who might have enacted their own articles of war. In answer to this I will not resort to the trifling arguments of uniformity of discipline, imperial army, &c. &c. They are idle ; but I will confess that I am highly pleased with a contrivance which, by a communion of interests, lays the only constitutional foundation of union we have ever had between the two islands.—I would to God it were more extensive and indissoluble ! The army, tho' not imperial, is the army of the empire. In its foreign successes each country has an hope to gratify ; in the possibility of domestic injury from it, each country stakes a fear. The authority over the army of Ireland then should, as much as possible, be communicable ; at least England, as she is liable to the mischief, should have some remedy. Now in as much as England and Ireland in this view of common hopes and

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and fears form but one body, liable to be affected by the same danger, exemption from that danger is better secured to both by a participation of control.—For, take notice they have a common enemy in the ambition of the prince to whose command the army is constitutionally obedient. The establishment of the Irish army, the provision for its support, and the law to regulate it, proceed from the parliament of Ireland; but the parliament of England retains a check in its hand influencing the duration of that army, and this is perfectly consistent with the constitutional attributes of the Irish parliament.

The English parliament meddles not in our taxation; it demands no influence in our separate legislation. These are our own concerns,—without exclusive supremacy in them we should not be free.—But the continuance of the army of Ireland is a joint concern.—It is not a separate attribute of the exclusive legislation of Ireland, it is the object of the care of the empire,  
and



and the continuance of the army of Ireland, under circumstances of eventual possibility, would be ruinous to English liberty, and perhaps to our own. The people of England, by perseverance in caution and jealousy of power, have acquired a great constitution; they have participated that constitution with us, because we are their fellow-subjects under the same king, or rather they have lent us the model of their constitution.—They had been fools indeed if they had made us fellow-subjects, with a power to arm the crown, at our pleasure, against their liberties. The operation of this principle was perhaps too strongly marked in the conduct of the late Lord Chatham on a particular occasion. In the year 1769, upon a requisition of the Crown, an augmentation of the forces in Ireland was voted in the Irish parliament, not however without a previous permission in a British statute. Lord Chatham then in opposition, having considered this Irish proceeding as a species of separate national establish-

establishment of the Irish army, by the parliament of Ireland, threatened the minister's head who had permitted it; and, in the effusion of his eloquence, lamented the loss sustained by the constitution in the following figurative expression: *That the minister had permitted the strongest feather to be plucked from the wing of the British eagle.*

I perceive it will be objected, that in the relative power of the parliament of England consists our weakness—that the ambition of that parliament to extend its supremacy over Ireland, is what we have most to fear, and that on this account any interference with the Irish army, even remotely, should not be permitted to the British parliament.

To this I answer, that our danger, on this head, is not increased by the control over the duration of our Mutiny Bill, communicated thro' the articles of war; nor is the power of the British parliament over

us in any degree augmented by it. It is in the number, the discipline, and the application of the army, that the danger of the army consists; and the British parliament possesses no power with regard to any of these. The British parliament as well as our own, has an interest in watching the prince's ambition, and the use he shall make, or meditate to make, of his army. There is but one possible supposition of case wherein the entire control over the duration of our own army were better in our own hands; I mean in the case of a combination of interests between the parliament of England, the people of England, and the king of Ireland, to destroy our freedom. If that unnatural combination shall ever take place, the question will cease to be speculative. All will be reduced to the question of force, between the two nations, wherein parchment barriers will little avail either. Great-Britain on her part has the very same combination in Ireland to guard against.

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I must observe that this mode which has been adopted, of checking the duration of the Irish army, by a remote power deposited in the care of the British parliament, out of whose hands the Irish army has been lately taken by our Mutiny-law, is perfectly analogous to the scheme of our constitution itself. The jealousy and control of separate powers, having the same interest by a communion of hopes and fears, in the duration of the constitution is the characteristic principle of it. The remainder of the author's arguments will require little or no trouble.

The hardships imposed on the military people themselves by the perpetuity of the Irish Mutiny-law, may be remedied when they shall complain of them. They will be best known by experience, and a premature interference in most cases produces imperfect remedy. I must observe however, that, in my humble opinion, the author's care of the military is somewhat misplaced. If danger to our liberties is threatened from a standing army in the degree

the author represents, the more numerous the difficulties are which surround a military life, the less encouragement will there be to enter into it, and the safer will our freedom be on account of these difficulties; so that in truth he has altogether mistaken this part of his premises.

Concerning his argument, that the parliament being octennial, had exceeded the limits of its power when it enacted a perpetual Mutiny-law—although I think his ground uncommonly weak, I am very unwilling to indulge him by a contest. Appeals from the operations of parliament to the judgment of the people, I hold to be serious things. They are our last resource against the very extent of the worst complication of constitutional depravity, and should not be weakened by idle use or misapplication. Besides it would be submitting to an imposition to give him a second chance for the event of a question which has already been decided against him. Present himself in parliament on the  
day



day of debate, *et cujus "pars magna" fuit*—the issue which he then knit has precluded him from demurring upon the ground of the illegality of the assumption of the parliament. His present appeal is an insult to parliament, and to discuss it with him were to become his accomplice in a dangerous scene of mockery.

As to his objection to the clause, granting to his majesty a power of superadding articles of war, not extending to life or limb, to those approved of in parliament; I will only remark, that the clause is exactly copied from the British statute, a statute enacted in the season of the full-blown jealousy and vigilancy of the British people. The necessity for such a discretionary power in the executive authority, I presume, does exist; and certainly he has no right to question it here; for a Mutiny-bill, as in England, was the object of the pursuit of him and his party in parliament, and he cannot justly complain of such parts of the  
Irish.

Irish law as are true copies of what he himself fought.

Having endeavoured to convince my countrymen of the futility of these prophetic illusions held forth by the pamphlet, I beg their attention for a moment, whilst, in my turn, I try to discover some advantages derived to Ireland by means of the Mutiny-bill, and peculiarly by means of its perpetuity. The design of the Mutiny-law in Ireland had a two-fold end. In one point of its operation it was intended to vindicate the exclusive supremacy of the Irish parliament over the kingdom of Ireland, by a *solemn act*, and the complete acquiescence of Great-Britain in that act, proves the first end to be fully attained; so that with regard to the exclusive supremacy of the Irish legislature over Ireland, the Mutiny-law is perfectly a *charter*.

The other end in contemplation was, to take the legislative establishment of our army out of the authority of Great-Britain,  
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and to hand it over where it ought to be—to the parliament of Ireland. This end has likewise been attained, not the less effectually because innoxiously to the liberties of Great-Britain.

The comprehensive design of compassing these two important ends by one not very alarming measure, was an effort of wisdom above my praise, and one for which Mr. Bushe deserves a statue in his country! He prudently took advantage of England's distressed situation to extort from her a dereliction, which, though it might alarm her pride, could not weaken her powers. He embraced the lucky occasion of procuring for Ireland a constitution when it was not very convenient for England to refuse to grant it. This will be best understood by reflecting on the defects in our constitution which have been remedied by this law.

Before Great-Britain had acquiesced in our Mutiny Law, and before she had sealed the contract of her acquiescence by leaving  
Ireland

Ireland out in the provisions of her own, the legislation of Ireland was actually participated by the parliaments of the two countries, and taxation itself, tho' not yet ventured upon, was but suspended over our heads. The swaggering fulminations of Bully Rigby, on this subject, in the British senate, like the distant rumblings of Jupiter, served to remind our mortal parliament of its own imperfect nature, and forbid it to attribute to itself any greater share of omnipotency than that which the adulation of poetry had long since prostituted upon Augustus,---*divisum imperium cum Jove Cæsar habet*. The case is now altered by means of this law. We have in it a charter of our exclusive parliamentary attributes; and we have that charter perpetually. Had the law been expirable, the charter of our exclusive supremacy would be precarious.---Sent into England every two years for the royal assent, a fit of returning pride, or a bettered condition of their affairs, might induce the Crown to  
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withhold the assent, our charter would then fall to the ground, and we should have no right to complain; for it would undergo a constitutional fate: whereas any attempt on the part of Great-Britain to revoke it, in its present condition, will be an unconstitutional violence, and a direct declaration of war.

Another defect in our constitution, remedied by this law, was that of the military establishment. It was a galling circumstance of our abject condition, that the army in this kingdom, supported by its revenues, was not an Irish army, but an army of English institution and government, quartered upon us without even the ceremony or dignity of a British act of parliament, but by a negatively permissive clause alone in the English statute 10th William III.

In respect to its military establishment, Ireland, before the enacting of her own Mutiny Law, had more the appearance of  
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an unemancipated province than that of an imperial free kingdom. With an army of 15,000 men quartered upon her by that very parliament which actually presumed to legislate for her, and talked eventually of taxing her, could she be said to possess any constitution at all? By means of the Mutiny Law her exclusive legislation is, in my opinion, effectually vindicated, and the Irish army becomes her own. Had the Irish parliament rejected the Mutiny Bill, in its altered state, on its return from England, they would have done very wrong, for they would have lost the first advantage; the alteration appears to have made our legislative security more perfect, and the evil with regard to the military was a very doubtful speculation. With what propriety or decency then can the author of the pamphlet presume to disgrace the present parliament in the eyes of their constituents?---“ *When the period of this parliament shall arrive,*” will they not be able to say to their constituents---You entrusted

trusted to our care a constitution fraught with imperfections, we restore one to you nearly perfect. At the commencement of our trust you were liable to have laws made for you by a foreign parliament, and your property was threatened to be taxed by the same authority. From these dreadful evils have we delivered you, without blood or contest. An army which was quartered upon you, and which, as you were obliged to maintain it, could be considered with regard to you only as an army of freebooters in your country, we have made your own army. Your own in point of establishment, in point of provision, and of regulation. Added to all this, it has been our peculiar happiness to see, during the administration of our trust, the trade of the universe newly and unexpectedly laid open to your country, and to see industry and commerce begin to flourish in the land. These will be the comfortable reflections of the persons who compose the present parliament of Ireland, and historical comparison will do justice to their memory.

Having now considered the argument of this pamphlet in the points of view, wherein it might be supposed to create vain apprehensions in the minds of the people; I would most willingly take my leave of it, did not a respect for the moral intercourse of society render it necessary to take some notice of certain passages in the pamphlet, which, I am persuaded, are to be ascribed to the zeal of the author rather than to a deliberate purpose of doing public mischief, or of gratifying personal feeling. The passages of the nature I allude to occur frequently in the pamphlet: two alone of them I transcribe for example. The first is as follows:

*“ They whose friends had been neglected, or whose written proposals of a very corrupt nature had not been complied with, and who under that disgust, had opposed Lord Buckingham on the subject of commerce, now, having made up matters with the court, opposed the people on the subject of liberty. They who had been accustomed to make private ad-*  
*vantage*

*vantage of public injuries, and who supported their retainers on their suffrages, blessed indeed with ample property, but by a servile following made dependent upon government, opposed the return of your liberty as they had until hurried away in the tide of 1779, opposed the extension of your trade. They charged your struggle for liberty as a design against property, a conspiracy to rob the great by a pillaging commonalty; they made this charge with the style and air of authority, as if property intitled the proprietor not only to sell himself, but to sell and load the public with his comrades and sycophants, and added consequence and consecration to such infamous traffic. They who hated the people from whom they had just proceeded, they who had little principle and no property, except your spoil, they who fear lest this kingdom should become too considerable to be bought and sold; all those who flourish in a province, and would sink in a nation, that interior species of plausible character actuated by little objects and a weak intellect, formed to shine in a court but shrivelled in a free country, fell into the same*

*same idle, insolent, conceited way of talking."*  
 Vide "*Observations on the Mutiny Bill,*"  
 P. 39.

The 2d runs thus :

*"If any thing could aggravate such a measure, it is the consideration that the motive was as profligate as the law was mischievous; and that this bill has been accompanied as it was produced by a most profuse application of honours and a faithless application of money. We have seen its conscientious supporters paid for their vote, either in their own person or in that of their friends; or publicly balked when they expected to be bribed. The House of Commons was actually canvassed, and men desperate of corruption were solicited once more into their original state of mendicant importunity. Places, pensions, promises, ready money, the whole mystery of ecclesiastical patronage, all like the faith of the Lord Lieutenant, were prostituted on this occasion."*  
 Vide "*Observations on the Mutiny Bill,*"  
 p. 67.

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I cannot conceive a greater outrage upon society than these indiscriminate and extraordinary charges contain: better the author had written the names under his pictures than to have left them thus to be applied at hazard, or as the personal malice and private resentments of individuals one towards another in society shall at leisure suggest.

The scheme of the country parson, who, over the communion-table where the ten commandments had been engraved, affixed a parishioner's name to each commandment which he would insinuate he individually had broken, was certainly more honourable and more candid than the insinuations of this pamphlet; yet I believe every body will say, that the parson was more influenced by a desire of gratifying his own personal malice, than by that of reforming his congregation.

The conduct of corrupt traffic described by the author in the administration of  
 Lord

Lord Buckinghamshire must have been extremely open, or the author must have been in a situation peculiarly advantageous for observation.

I wish to shew the author the danger of this species of satire in which he deals. "If any thing," says he, speaking of the Mutiny-bill, "*could aggravate such a measure, it is the consideration that the motive was as profligate, as the law was mischievous.*"

The motives of every man's conduct lie within his own breast, and they can only be inferred from external signs—indeed the charge of *a profligate motive* is nothing more than a conclusion in the mind of him who makes the charge, and should therefore be urged with infinite caution. The injustice of acting otherwise when we draw conclusions from external appearances, to argue *a profligate motive*, will in no case appear more strong than in that furnished upon this occasion by the author himself.

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Supposing the pamphlet to have been written by the gentleman to whom universal opinion has ascribed it, I can take upon me to say that there is not a man of purer *motives* in the kingdom, nor one more attached to the preservation of the peace of the nation, and the safety of his sovereign in his crown and dignity. Yet if a malicious, or an over-zealous partizan, urged by “*an aristocratic impatience under a charge of perished principle and execrated character,*” should institute an enquiry into the *motives* which had influenced the author to write and publish the pamphlet in question; is he not furnished with materials upon which to form an hasty opinion, that the *motives* were as *profligate* as they were *feditious*?

Would he not reason thus? The author of the pamphlet has stated a law of the last sessions of the Irish parliament, as likely to prove injurious to the liberties of the people: he has stated this law as proceeding from a combination of treacherous design in government,

vernment, and extreme corruption in parliament : he has stated it as having been enacted against the interest and wishes of an armed people, whom he describes, not as using force, but “ *standing by, giving a silent confidence to liberty.*” He could not expect that his pamphlet would have the effect to reform the majority of such a parliament, men “ *lost in the public estimation, conscious of public detestation, supported by public money!*” As little could he hope to produce reformation in an hardened court, the *irresponsible* and unceasing contrivers of Ireland’s ruin. What then remained? Would it not follow in his conclusion, that the author’s only *motive* was to convert the “ *standing by*” of the Volunteers into an active principle of FALLING ON, by which he might exterminate the majority of that parliament which he could entertain no hopes of rendering honest. He would charge him with a design to accomplish the repeal of the perpetual Mutiny-law, the evil of which is only in speculation

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tion, by the bloody and destructive progress of a civil war in his country. Under this mode of reasoning and conclusion, could we save the humanity of the author of the pamphlet, but by a sacrifice of his judgment, or his judgment but by yielding up his humanity ! Perhaps in the exultation of ungenerous triumph, his adversary would offer him, in the words of his own pamphlet, “ *a retreat for a very vicious conduct in a very bad understanding.*” He likewise would not be wanting to collect from the pamphlet, in aid of his reasoning, such passages as should seem to favour his conclusion. He would probably urge the following quotation as demonstrative of the author’s motive. “ *The spirit of the nation is high, her ministers distracted, her liberty in force, her volunteers numerous, and the mischief of a military government suspended by an armed people.*” Nor, probably, would he forget that the *question of their legality is*  
 LOST IN THEIR NUMBERS.



In the same spirit of malice perhaps he would urge that the *motive* of the author of the pamphlet appeared in the very first page of his book, where an animadversion on the social disposition of the country is coupled with the clumsy good-humour of the inhabitants, and both are introduced as circumstances of political supineness. The lean habit of Cassius was an object of the sagacious Cæsar's apprehension, who wished rather that those about him should sleep a nights, and perhaps be guilty of a little *clumsy good-humour*, than dedicate their vigils at the shrine of sedition. Men of the constitution dreaded by Cæsar are born with a disposition to consider society as always having need of reformation.—They shrink from *the hearty intercourse of private life*, and are apt to feel every effort of *good-humour* as a *clumsy* freedom. If to the coldness of this social character there is unfortunately joined a warm ambitious desire for personal distinction, the heated particles of the latter part of the character, meeting with the chilly damps of the

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the former, too often produce a mental *volcano*, the lava of which finding vent in seditious pamphlets, rushes forth impetuously on the public, and threatens desolation to all around. Thus would the man reason, who was interested in misrepresenting our author's *motive* for the publication of his pamphlet.

Whatever may have been his motive, the fact is, that the people of this country are perfectly satisfied with our present commercial and political condition. I speak not of the Sugar-bakers, nor of the Committee of Merchants of Dublin, whose interest is inversely exactly as that of the people in general. I speak of the kingdom at large. By the bye the resolutions of some of our armed corps here, last year, expressive of their disapprobation of the conduct of parliament in the last days of the last session, arose entirely from a disappointment in the article of the Sugar Duty. The Merchants Corps, composed for the most part of persons interested in the trade of Dublin, and influ-

influenced exceedingly by the Sugar-bakers and by the Committee of Merchants of Dublin, led the way in this expression of discontent. Their example was followed, as well as I remember, but by the corps over which Sir Edward Newenham presided, and by that of which Mr. James Napper Tandy was then a member. Had the cause of dissatisfaction been well founded, complaints had been universal, and every corps in the kingdom would have joined in them. But, I now see, with pleasure, that not even the zeal and abilities of the author of the pamphlet can raise a murmur.

The Roman Catholics of Ireland, for whose edification the author has been at the pains to compose a most enthusiastic metaphorical piece of eloquence, needed no inspiration to determine their loyalty and gratitude to the illustrious house of Brunswick. Indeed our zealous ancestors took special care to throw them, inevitably, into the arms of the prerogative, not merely by  
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putting them out of the protection of the laws, but by afflicting them with a code, made exclusively for themselves, which, for severity and persecution, no less in political than religious concerns, would have done honour to the invention of an inquisition. Like mice, confined in the air-pump of a cruel philosopher, they have been suffered to breathe but by experiment; and they now perceive that from the accession of George I. to the present hour, they have been indebted to the mildness and humanity of the executive authority of the state alone, for an exemption from extermination in the land of their inheritance. Their loyalty hath kept pace with their obligations; and I will be bold to say that no prince in Christendom hath a more perfect security of fidelity in his subjects, than our most gracious sovereign possesses in the hearts of the Irish Roman Catholics. Revolutions have not been favourable to them, and it were strange infatuation indeed if, at this hour, they could be induced to join in factious clamour, and to add  
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their weight to a party, whose success upon every struggle has been succeeded by fresh acts of legislative tyranny over them. In patience and forbearance they have worn out the tedious night of their affliction, and when the dawn of civil and religious toleration begins to light them to a new day, it is not likely that they will cloud it with projects of turbulence and of discontent. The prerogative alone, for near a century, has been the shield of their defence. Pride as well as gratitude will incite them to protect its lustre, nor suffer its polish to be sullied by the rude finger of faction.

The state has nothing to fear from the Roman Catholics of Ireland!

Our people begin to find generally, by an experience of export and import, belying all seditious theory, that their trade is opened in the most unequivocal extent. They know that the acquisition of constitution is, in its own nature, a progressive thing; and that, in this respect, Ireland has



has acquired more in the last sessions of her parliament, than England had done in any century, save only one, of her whole political existence.

They now see that their constitution had been shackled only for the purpose of securing to Great-Britain a monopoly in their trade; and that the cause being removed the effect must cease.

They see the difficulties in which England is at present involved, and they do not mean to add to her calamity by an unreasonable demand of the redress of speculative grievances.

When they behold her, like that great instrument of her glory, a ship of war, tossed about in a tempestuous sea, and that destruction is threatened on all sides, they feel how impolitic a thing it would be in the hands to mutiny. Prudence and kind offices, upon this occasion, may for ever bury in oblivion the circumstances of former contentions.

tentions.—It is neither wise nor honourable to urge Great-Britain further.

The reader of the history of antient Rome finds himself uncommonly interested for the fate of the republic, upon the occasion of the successful attack of the Gauls under their king Brennus. The human mind cannot conceive a more awful scene, than that which represents the venerable and haughty senate, reduced to bargain for the redemption of their city, and to *chaffer* about the weight of the gold. But when the aggravation of the barbarian was insolently flung into the scale of their calamity, it roused the indignation of Roman virtue in a degree proportioned to the exigency, and the illustrious CAMILLUS effected the ransom of his country not with gold, but STEEL.

T H E E N D.



